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health reform strategies. Besides, the effect of AIDS on
infant mortality is not significant.19 Furthermore, other
countries that are also experiencing a protracted civil
war, such as Sri Lanka, have maintained good social
welfare through a non-market based health system.20
What can be learnt from the market
reform experience?
Several lessons can be learnt from the market reform
experiment. Firstly, market economic principles are
good for generating wealth but poor at improving
health and social welfare. Secondly, to carry out genu-
ine health sector reforms based on agreed health
objectives, the health reforms must be disentangled
from market based economic reforms. In particular,
governments must guarantee social security and
essential health services to all. This means macro-
economic variables should be manipulated to facilitate
the attainment of social welfare targets without
jeopardising economic growth. This is possible, as
countries such as Costa Rica and Sri Lanka have
shown.20
Thirdly, the market philosophy, which is based on
greed and the accumulation of profit, cannot be the
proper basis for maximising welfare. Instead, the prin-
ciples of solidarity and compassion should provide the
basis for social welfare. The study of how to achieve
maximum health within a given economy should be
developed as a separate discipline from market based
health economics, which is primarily concerned with
minimisation of spending. Fourthly, aid and technical
assistance to poor countries must be given and
managed in a way that ensures a positive effect on
health and social welfare. In the long run, poor
countries such as Uganda should adopt a universal
health and welfare framework, which they must
increasingly finance from internal sources. Lastly,
health and welfare must be assessed by using genuine
indicators that comprehensively measure the reality of
people’s lives.
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Commentary: the devil is in the detail
Martin McKee, Barbara McPake
Okuonzi argues that the introduction of market
reforms, into the Ugandan health system has been a
failure.1 However, health systems are extremely
complex and, as the debate about the British internal
market shows, attribution of cause and effect is far from
easy. The situation in Uganda is equally complex, with
reforms taking place against a background of regional
conflict, growing inequalities, and changes in other
sectors. Furthermore, while Okuonzi focuses on hospi-
tals, it is equally important to look at primary care,
which the Ugandan reforms have sought to
strengthen.
Can we gain insights about market reforms from
other low and middle income countries? It is
important to distinguish between reforms directed at
funding and those directed at delivery of care. Many
policies aimed at funding, such as user fees, increase
the economic burden on families. This can deter them
from seeking necessary care and increases the risk of
impoverishment from expenditure on catastrophic ill-
ness,2 as is now happening in China.w1
Summary points
Donor agencies increasingly require market based
health reforms before giving grants to developing
countries
In Uganda market reforms have not improved
health care
Inequity in access to health care has increased
and important health indicators have worsened
More emphasis needs to placed on social welfare
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The situation regarding reforms to healthcare
delivery is more mixed, although the available evidence
is limited and often context specific. One issue is
contracting with private providers by public bodies.
This offers potential benefits by combining public
finance with private provision, but in practice these
may not always be realised.3 For example, although a
privately owned hospital in Zimbabwe offered services
of at least as good quality as a nearby government
hospital and at lower prices, the private hospital’s
failure to control admission thresholds allowed costs to
increase.w2 Other research in South Africa and
Zimbabwe found that, although costs were lower in
private hospitals, any savings were eliminated by the
cost of contracting.w3
A second issue is increased autonomy of providers.
This has been successful only when facilities invest in
management techniques and training linked to
appropriate incentive systems for staff.4 Reviews of
experience in eastern Europe5 and sub-Saharan Africa
have identified only modest success in achieving the
stated goals of increasing autonomy.6
A third issue is the question of public or private pro-
vision. Enthusiasm for privatising state facilities, to
achieve supposed efficiency gains, is being tempered by
a realisation that the evidence is rather mixed. A study of
government and non-governmental dispensaries in
Tanzania found considerable variation in both sectors.w4
This finding was replicated in research on primary care
providers in the same country; although quality of care
was, on average, better in the private providers, much
care was of low quality care in both types of facility.w5
Similar results have been obtained from research in
Senegal.w6 In summary, little evidence is available to sup-
port the contention that private provision is better than
public, and what evidence exists indicates that there is
often considerable variation in both.
So are market oriented reforms in health care good
or bad? There is no simple answer. Much depends on
how they are implemented. This is an area where more
evidence rather than ideology is needed.
MM and BM are members of the UK Department for
International Development’s (DfID) health systems develop-
ment knowledge programme. DfID accepts no responsibility for
the views expressed.
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Run with your client, not after
Chris was always climbing the fence, an eight feet high, chain link
structure that surrounded the euphemistic “garden” on three
sides. The fourth side faced the three storey, red brick ward that
was home of sorts to a dozen people with learning disabilities and
challenging behaviour, and half a dozen members of staff. Chris’s
most prominent behaviour was “absconding from the ward”—the
reason for his admission and an activity he engaged in quite
successfully on a daily basis.
The escape itself was never witnessed. Chris would fade
imperceptibly from the consciousness of the assembled staff and
then suddenly reappear running full tilt away from the fence. The
staff would then snap into action, our joint and single purpose to
catch him and bring him back to within the confines of the fence.
However, our prey stood more than six feet tall and, with daily
practice, had developed the athleticism and speed of an ostrich.
He could change direction in an instant with no evident loss of
speed and could slow down and speed up with no suggestion of
inertia.
We would break into smaller units and, running at breakneck
speed, try to limit the available directions he might take. We
would gather volunteers to the chase as if in a stampede. But
catching Chris, despite our greater numbers, invariably took
upwards of an hour. Pursuers would retire from the chase
exhausted; sometimes entire shifts would change during the hunt.
Ultimately, however, Chris would be apprehended and, only
partially subdued in a ruck of staff, guided back to the ward,
where he would be carefully watched for the rest of the day while
he returned our gaze as a scowl.
I don’t know how it happened, nobody does. Chris had
breached the fence again, and somebody went to fetch him back.
But this time the mood was completely different, completely at
odds with the usual sense of crisis. Perhaps we no longer cared.
Perhaps, somehow, we were inspired. Our solitary staff member
didn’t pursue Chris. He didn’t barrel after him like a Pamplona
bull. He just ran. Within a few minutes he was shoulder to
shoulder with Chris and running alongside. And they kept
running. They ran for a further 10 minutes or so and then
returned to the ward. Nobody laid a finger on Chris. Nobody said
a word. There was a 10 minute run and then home.
There were no escapes after that. Just runs.
Jim Cromwell clinical psychologist, South West London and St
George’s Mental Health NHS Trust, London
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